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CAMPAIGNS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND
CITIZENSHIP: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF RESIDENT ALIENS TO
FINANCE FEDERAL ELECTIONS
INTRODUCTION
The 1996 Presidential elections were marred by the specter of
scandal. Foreign nationals, who are barred from contributing to Ameri-
can campaigns, allegedly sponsored contributions to the Democratic
National Committee ("DNC") totaling nearly one million dollars.' Arief
and Soraya Wiriadinata, an Indonesian couple living in Virginia, do-
nated $425,000 to the DNC. 2 Although they were legal resident ali-
ens at the time, their contribution attracted attention because of the
Wiriadinatas' modest lifestyle. 3 In addition, Mrs. Wiriadinata's father
was a partner of an Indonesian billionaire named Mochtar Riady, the
leader of an Asian financial and real estate conglomerate.' Yogesh
Ghandi, an Indian businessman and resident alien living in California,
donated $325,000 to the DNC. 5 His donation was also deemed suspect
because he owed $10,000 in back taxes and had testified in court that
h.e did not have any U.S. assets.'' Finally, the DNC raised $140,000 at a
I See Michael Isikoff and Mark Elosenhall, Galling All Lauyers, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 1996, ;11.
46, 46. 2 U.S.C. § 44Ie (1994) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for a foreign national directly or through any other person
to make any contribution of money or other thing of value, or to promise expressly
or impliedly to make any such contribution, in connection with an election to any
political office or in connection with any pi -Unary election, convention, or caucus
held to select candidates any political office 
A foreign national is defined as "an individual who is not a citizen of the United
States and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence...."
2 U.S.C. § 441e(b) (2).
2 See Peter El. Stone, A Ruckus over "Soft" Money from Foreigners, NAT'L J., Nov. 9, 1996,
2413, 2413.
2 See id; Kevin Merida and Serge F. Kovaleski, Mysteries Arise All Along the Asian Money Tirdl,
WASH. Post, No 1, 1996, at Al. A resident. alien is a person who holds a green card, meaning
he or site has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(20) (1994);
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEIN/KOFF AND DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND Pot,tcY 393
(2d ed. 1991). To have been lawfully admitted for permanent resident, a resident alien must have
been "lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immi-
grant in accordance with the immigration laws .. ..” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (20).
4 See Merida and Kovaleski, supra note 3; Stone, supra note 2.
5 See Merida and Kovaleski, supra note 3; Stone, .supra note 2,
St See Merida and Kovaleski, supra note 3; Stone, supra note 2.
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luncheon attended by Vice President Gore at a Buddhist temple in
California.? Many of the resident alien temple Members received sti-
pends of only forty dollars a month, yet they donated $5,000 each to
the DNC.8
These questionable contributions raised two issues. First, were any
of the contributions financed by foreign nationals, who are barred
from contributing to American campaigns?9 Second, did any of the
resident alien donors, or their alleged foreign backers, receive quid
pro quos in exchange for their contributions? For example, the Clin-
ton administration has been accused of' changing its policies towards
Indonesia because of financial support provided by the Riady family."'
These accusations stem from the fact that although Clinton admon-
ished Indonesia's human rights record during his 1992 campaign, he
has allowed Indonesia to retain special low tariffs and has called for
the sale of military aircraft to the Indonesian government." President
Clinton has also admitted that members of the Riady family visited the
White House to discuss U.S. foreign policy and the Riadys' business
interests on about twenty occasions.' 2
Before the presidential election, the controversy prompted both
President Clinton and his challenger, Senator Robert Dole, to call for
a prohibition on campaign contributions from resident aliens.' 3 After
the election, President Clinton announced that the Democratic party
would no longer accept donations from resident aliens." In addition,
five bills have been introduced in Congress that render resident aliens
ineligible to spend money in connection with election campaigns.°
This note will analyze whether a ban on campaign contributions
and independent expenditures by resident aliens violates the First
Amendment.° Part I reviews the bills that have been introduced in
7 See Mirada and Kovaleski, supra note 3.
8 See id.
9 See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (1994).
I° See Robert A. Manning, Did Indonesian Campaign Dollars Buy Anything?, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 23, 1996, at A23; This Week With David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 1,
1996) [hereinafter Brinkley) (comments of Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.)).
11 See Manning, supra note 10; Brinkley, supra note 10.
12 See John Aloysius Farrell, Clinton Confidante in Hot Water Again, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24,
1996, at Al2.
'sSee Jotli Enda and Brigid Schulte, Clinton Calls for Finance Reform, Mutts-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Nov. '2, 1996, at Al.
14 SeeJames Bennet, President Announces Changes in How Democrats Raise Money, N.Y TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1997, at Al.
15 See infra Part I.
16 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . ..." U.S. CONST. amend. I. A ban on contributions and expenditures also
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Congress to ban contributions and expenditures by resident aliens. 17
Part II explains the framework used to test campaign finance limita-
tions placed on citizens which was first used by the United States
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.'s Part III reviews the case law con-
cerning resident aliens' speech rights.'g Part IV argues that the strict
scrutiny test used in Buckley is applicable to a ban on resident aliens'
contributions and expenditures because resident aliens' speech is ac-
corded full First Amendment protection.2° Finally, Part V applies the
Buckley test to the proposed bans and finds that they violate resident
aliens' right to free political expression and are therefore unconstitu-
tiona1. 2 '
I. CONGRESSIONAL MOVES TO BAN RESIDENT ALIEN
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES
There are two ways that bills introduced in Congress have sought
to ban contributions from resident aliens. 22 The first is to ban contri-
butions from all those ineligible to vote in federal elections; the second
is to broaden the definition of "foreign national" to include resident
aliens.23 The first method is used in the Bipartisan Campaign Finance
Reform Act of 1997, the most widely known of the bills introduced in
Congress thus far. 24 Sponsored principally by Senators John McCain
and Russell Feingold, the Campaign Finance Reform Act proposes to
amend 2 U.S.C. § 441e, which bars contributions from foreign nation-
als, to also bar contributions from individuals not qualified to vote in
raises equal protection concerns under the Fifth Amendment because of the disparate treatment
of resident aliens and citizens. See generally Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)
(holding that Civil Service Commission regulation barring noncitizens, including resident aliens,
from employment in federal civil service positions was unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
without due process is violation of Fifth Amendment); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
(holding that Congress may condition alien's eligibility for participation in federal medical
insurance program on continuous residence in United States for five-year period and admission
for permanent residence without violating Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment). Equal
protection issues will not be addressed in this Note. The Supreme Court has addressed the equal
protection rights of non-citizens under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause in only two
cases. See generally Hampton, 426 U.S. 88, Mathews, 426 U.S. 67.
17
 See infra Part I.
19
 424 U.S. 1, 12-30, 39-51 (1976) (per curiam); see infra Part II.
19 See infra Part
20 See infra Part IV,
21 See infra Part V.
22 See, e.g., Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure Act of 1997, S. 179, 105th Cong. § 3
(1997); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 306 (1997).
23 See, e.g., S. 179 § 3; S. 25, § 306.
24 S. 25 § 306.
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federal elections." Because only citizens are eligible to vote in fed-
eral elections, this measure in effect bars contributions from resident
aliens. 26
The Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure Act of 1997 seeks
to broaden the definition of "foreign national," the second method of
banning contributions from resident aliens." Sponsored by Senator
Kay Bailey Hutchison, this bill seeks to broaden the definition of
"foreign national" to include not only non-citizens who have not been
admitted for permanent residence, but also non-citizens who are per-
manent residents. 28 The ban on contributions from foreign nationals
would therefore include resident aliens."
All of the bills that have been introduced in Congress thus far seek
to ban both contributions and expenditures by resident aliens?' "Contri-
bution" refers to money donated directly to candidates running for
office.si "Expenditure," commonly called "soft money," refers to money
spent on independent advocacy." Expenditures include everything
25 Id. The bill, introduced on January 21, 1997, would make it
unlawful for an individual who is not qualified to register to vote in a Federal
election to make a contribution, or to promise expressly or impliedly to make a
contribution, in connection with a Federal election; or for any person to solicit,
accept, or receive a contribution in connection with a Federal election from an
individual who is not qualified to register to vote in a Federal election.
Id.; see 2 U.S.C. § 441c (1994). Note that the measure is worded broadly because it also seeks to
eliminate contributions from children. The same provision, in a bill of the same name, has been
introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.).
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 493, 105th Cong. § 241 (1997). Both bills are
currently in committee. 105 Bill Tracking S. 25 and H.R. 493, available in LEXIS, LEGIS library,
BLTRCK file.
26 See S. 25 § 306; H.R. 493 § 241. The 15th Amendment guarantees that Itlhe right of
citizens" to vote will not be abridged because of race. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The 19th
Amendment provides that the right of citizens" to vote cannot be denied on the basis of gender.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. Finally, the 26th Amendment secures the "right of citizens" to vote who
are 18 years of age or older. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
27 S. 179 § 3.
28 Id. Two bills introduced in the House of Representatives, by Representatives John Dingell
(D-Mich.) and William Goodling (R-Pa.), also seek to institute a ban on resident alien contribu-
tions by broadening the definition of "foreign national" to include resident aliens. Clean Sweep
Act of 1997, H.R. 179, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997); Federal Election Campaign Reform Act of 1997,
H.R. 140, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997). All three bills have been referred to committee. 105 Bill
Tracking S. 179, H.R. 140 and H.R. 179, available in LEXIS, LEGIS library, BLTRCK file.
28 See 2 U.S.C. § 441(e); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (20) (1994).
3° 5 ee S. 179 § 3; S. 25 § 306; H.R. 493 § 241; H.R. 179 § 7; H.R. 140 § 5.
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Stipp. V 1975); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam);
RODNEY A. Smota.A, SMOI.I.A AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OE SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 9-16 (1994).
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. V 1975); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7, 42; SMOLLA, supra note 31,
at 9-16.
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from donations to the Democratic or Republican National Committees
to the independent purchase of a newspaper advertisement. 33
II. THE BUCKLEY V. VA LEO FRAMEWORK
Contribution and expenditure limitations, as they apply to citi-
zens, were addressed by the United States Supreme Court in 1976 in
Buckley v. Valeo. 34 In Buckley, the Court considered constitutional chal-
lenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (the "Act") . 35 The
Act limited individual political contributions to $1,000 to any single
candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by
any contributor. 36 In addition, the Act restricted independent expendi-
tures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" by individuals and
groups to $1,000 per year. 37
The Court held that the contribution limitation did not violate
the First Amendment, but that the independent expenditure ceiling
did unconstitutionally inhibit political speech. 38 After confirming that
contributions and expenditures are protected by the First Amendment
because they constitute speech," the Court determined that the limi-
tations burdened political expression." The Court next subjected the
limitations to a strict scrutiny test, asking whether the burden placed
on speech by the limitations was justified by a compelling government
interest and, if so, whether the limitations were narrowly tailored. 41 As
for the first part of the test, the Court held that the burden on speech
by the contribution limitation was justified by a compelling govern-
ment interest, but that no government interest justified the severe
restrictions placed on speech by the expenditure limitation, 42 Reaching
the second part of the test only as it pertained to the contribution limi-
tation, the Court held that the contribution limitation was sufficiently
narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest 4 3
33 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20 n.20.
34 See id. at 12-30, 39-51.
35 See id. at 6.
35 See id. at 7; see also 18 U.S.C. § 608(h).
37 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7; see also 18 U.S.C. § 608(e). The Court defined an independent
expenditure relative to a clearly defined candidate as one which advocates the election or defeat.
of a candidate. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42; infra Part E1.C.
38 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29, 51.
3" See id. at 15-17.
4') See id. at 19-21.
41
 See id. at 25-30, 44-49.
42 See id. at 26, 45.
43
 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28, 29-30.
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A. Contributions and Expenditures Constitute Political Speech
The Court's analysis began with the premise that contributions
and expenditures constitute political speech, and thus they are subject
to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment." The Court reasoned
that the discussion of issues and candidates is integral to the function-
ing of a democracy." The First Amendment protects such political
expression "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."` 1s
The Court stressed that it is essential for citizens to be able to cast
informed votes. 47 Because communication in mass society costs money,
the Court further reasoned that restrictions on contributions and ex-
penditures reduce the quantity of expression by limiting the number
of issues discussed, the depth with which they are explored and the
size of the audience reached." The Court analogized the limitations
to "being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires
on a single tank of gasoline."49
B. Limitations on Contributions and Expenditures Burden
First Amendment Speech
After establishing that the contribution and expenditure limita-
tions implicated First Amendment interests, the Court next consid-
ered whether the limitations burdened free speech. 5° The Court held
that the contribution limitation constituted only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor's speech.51 The Court reasoned that a contribu-
tion expresses general support for a candidate, but it does not indicate
the basis for that support. 52 According to the Court, the symbolic act
of contributing solely constitutes political expression because the quan-
tity of a contributor's communication does not increase in proportion
to his contribution." Thus, the contribution limitation presented a
44 See id. at 14-17.
45 See id. at 14.
46 1d. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
47 See id. at 14-15.
46 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
49 See id. at 19 n.18.
5° See id. at 19-21.
51 See id. at 20-21.
52 See id. at 21.
54 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
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slight burden on speech because it still permitted symbolic expression
of support and discussion of the candidates and issues."
As for the expenditure limitation, however, the Court held that it
substantially burdened political speech.'' The Court reasoned that the
$1,000 ceiling on independent spending prevented citizens from ade-
quately utilizing the media, the most effective means of communica-
tion in a large society. 56 The Court noted, for example, that the expen-
diture limit of $1,000 would prevent the independent purchase of an
advertisement in a newspaper because the cost. of advertisement in a
metropolitan newspaper at that time was nearly $7,000.' 7
C. A Preliminary Matter-
Before the Buckley Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the
burden placed on speech by the contribution and limitation expendi-
tures, the Court determined the meaning of the expenditure litnita-
tion. 58 The operative language of the provision limited "any expendi-
ture relative to a clearly identified candidate," and there was no definition
clarifying exactly what expenditures were "relative to" a candidate.'"
The Court held that, in order to preserve the provision against invali-
dation on vagueness grounds, "relative to" a candidate was to be read
to mean "advocating the election or defeat or a candidate.'"' Thus, the
expenditure limitation applied only to expenditures for communica-
tions that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly iden-
tified candidate for federal office. 6 '
D. Application of the Strict Scrutiny 'Pest
Because the contribution and expenditure limitations burdened
speech, the Court subjected the limitations to a strict scrutiny test.62
The Court first analyzed whether the burdens placed on speech by the
contribution and expenditure limitations were justified by a compel-
ling government interest." Finding that only the contribution limita-
"See id.
55 See id. at 19.
513 See id. at 19-20 & n.20.
"See id. at 20 n.20.
58 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-44.
59 See id. at 41,
(4) See id. at 42,44.
81 See id. at 44.
'i2 See id. at 25-30,44-49.
113 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26,44-45.
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don was justified by a compelling government interest, the Court next
asked whether this limitation was narrowly tailored, and held that it
was."'
1. Compelling Government Interest
Addressing the contribution limitation first, the Court held that
the government's interest in preventing actual or perceived corruption
resulting from large individual contributions was sufficiently compel-
ling to justify the slight burden placed on political expression."5 The
Court reasoned that the integrity of a representative democracy is
undermined not only by actual quid pro quo arrangements, but also
by the appearance of improper influence."`'
As for the expenditure ceiling, however, the Court held that the
government interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption was inadequate to justify the heavy burden placed on speech
by the expenditure limitation.° The Court reasoned that, unlike the
total ban on large donations achieved by the contribution limitation,
the expenditure limitation prevented only sonic large contributions.""
Resourceful contributors seeking to buy influence could easily circum-
vent the restriction on expenditures by expressly advocating the elec-
tion or defeat of candidates.° As long as contributors refrained from
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified can-
didate, they could spend as much as they wanted in promoting a
candidate and his or her views.'"
The Court further reasoned that the danger of impropriety posed
by independent expenditures was not comparable to that posed by
individual contributions. 71 According to the Court, independent ex-
penditures, by definition, are totally independent and are not subject
to the control of, or made in concert with, the candidate. 72 Inde-
pendent expenditures are therefore less valuable to the candidate and
less likely to have been offered in exchange for improper influence."
'" See id. at 27-29,29-30.
"5 See id. at 26.
66 See id. at 26-27.
1i7 See id. at 45.
"" See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
6"See id.
7"See id.
71 See id. at 46.
72 See id. at 46,47.
75 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
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Thus, the Court held that the expenditure limitation severely bur-
dened speech even though the expenditures presented little potential
for abuse.74
The Court further held that the government's asserted interest in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals to influence the outcome
of elections also failed to justify the Act's limitation on independent
expenditures. 75
 The Court reasoned that "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment . . . ."7" By restricting the speech of the wealthy, the Act
thus violated the First Amendment's goal of promoting the broad
discussion of diverse and antagonistic ideas."
2. Narrowly Tailored
The Court held that the Act's contribution limitations were nar-
rowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest in pre-
venting actual or perceived impropriety."' The Court discarded two
alternative means of regulation—bribery and disclosure laws.'" Bribery
laws, the Court reasoned, dealt only with the most blatant attempts to
influence governmental action, while disclosure provisions were only
a partial measure?'" Thus, the limitations focused narrowly on the
problem of large campaign contributions without jeopardizing the
ability of citizens to engage in independent political expression?"
The Court also addressed two overbreadth challenges." 2 The first
challenge was that the contribution ceiling was over-inclusive because
most large contributors do not seek improper influence. 83 The Court
was not persuaded, however, reasoning that it is difficult to isolate
suspect contributors and that safeguarding against even the appear-
74 See id.
75 See id. at 48-49.
m
77 See id. at 49.
78 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28,29-30. Because the Court held that the government did not
assess enough of a compelling interest in limiting independent expenditures, it did not reach
a discussion of whether the provision was narrowly tailored. See id. at 45-47. The Court implied,
however, that it did not believe the provision could he tailored in such a way as to secure the
government's goals. Sec id.
79 See id. at 27
-28.
99 See id.
" 1 See id. at 28
-29.
See id. at 29—SO.
83 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
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ance of impropriety requires the elimination of all opportunities for
abuse." The second overbreadth claim was that the $1,000 contribu-
tion limit was too low because it would take much more than $1,000
to gain improper influence in statewide or national elections. 85 The
Court also rejected this claim, stating that as long as some limitation
was constitutional, it was unwilling to fine tune it. 86
III. THE RIGHTS OF RESIDENT ALIENS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A key step in the Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutionality
of the Act's limitations in Buckley v. Valeo was the finding that contri-
butions and expenditures constitute speech that is protected by the
First Amendment!' Because contributors' speech, in the form of money,
implicated First Amendment interests, restrictions on that speech were
subject to strict scrutiny!' In contemplating a ban on contributions
from resident aliens, who are not citizens and thus ineligible to vote
in federal elections, the question that arises is whether the speech of
resident aliens is also protected by the First Amendment. If resident
aliens' speech is removed from the ambit of the First Amendment, then
the Buckley strict scrutiny test is inapplicable. Instead, the Court would
apply a deferential standard of review consistent with Congress's ple-
nary power over imtnigration.89 If, however, the First Amendment equally
protects citizens and resident aliens, then the strict scrutiny test out-
lined in Buckley is applicable. 9" This part reviews the case law addressing
the extent to which resident aliens' speech is protected by the First
Amendment.
A. The Chinese Exclusion Case
Although Chae Chin Ping v. United States, also kn'own as the Chinese
Exclusion Case, did not deal expressly with the First Amendment rights
of non-citizens, it established the Supreme Court's deference to Con-
gress's plenary power over immigration.'" In the Chinese Exclusion Case,
"4 See id. at 30.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See 424 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976) (per curiam).
88 See id. at 25-30, 44-49.
HY See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
HY See infra Part V.
91 See 130 U.S. at 609. The source of this power is Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution,
which states that "[t] he Congress shall have Power . . . establish an [sic] uniform Rule of
Naturalization ...." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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decided in 1889, the Supreme Court held that Chinese laborers could
be excluded from the United States."2 Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese
laborer who lived and worked in California from 1875 to 1887. 93 In
1887, he made a trip to China, bringing with him a certificate that
entitled him to reenter the United States. 94 He returned to the United
States in 1888, but was not permitted to land because Congress had
passed an act a week earlier that annulled all such certificates." Chae
Chan Ping sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been
unlawfully restrained and that he was entitled to enter the United
States."
The Court reasoned that the government, through the legislative
branch, could exclude non-citizens from the United States." Jurisdic-
tion over its territory, the Court explained, was necessary to the inde-
pendence of a nation." If the government could not exclude aliens, it
would be subject to the control of a foreign power.'• Protecting the
nation's independence and preserving it against foreign encroach-
ment were thus matters of national security.m The Court further rea-
soned that the government's decisions pursuant to the exercise of its
power were conclusive upon all departments of the government, in-
cluding the judiciary. 1 "' Because the Court reasoned that policies con-
cerning aliens were part of the political domain, it found that defer-
ential judicial review was required." The Court therefore held that
Congress's plenary power over immigration allowed the exclusion of
Chae Chan Ping."
92 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
"See id. at 582.
t1 See id.
95 See id. The act provided that "it shall be unlawful for any [C]iiiiese laborer who shall at
any time heretofore have been, or who may now or hereafter be, a resident within the United
States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart therefrom, and shall not have returned before
the passage of this act, to return to, or remain in, the United States." Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch.
1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888). It further provided that "every certificate heretofore issued in pursu-
ance thereof, is hereby declared void and of no effect, and the [C]hinese laborer claiming
admission by virtue thereof shall not be permitted to enter the United States." Id. The Court did
not address whether the act constituted an ex post facto law.
96 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582-83.
7 See id. at 603.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 604.
lu° See id. at 606.
101 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U,S. at 606.
1 "2 See id. at 609,
I" See id.
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The Chinese Exclusion Case thus set a deferential standard often
reiterated in subsequent cases.'" 4
 That Congress has significant power
in the realm of immigration cannot be disputed.'" The question is how
far that power extends.
B. The Subversive Acts Cases
The bulk of First Amendment law as it pertains to resident aliens
has developed in the subversive acts context.'"" "Subversive acts" refer
to acts aimed at the overthrow of the government.'° 7
 Since 1903, Con-
gress has passed a number of measures calling for the exclusion or
deportation of aliens whom the government deemed subversive based
on their political beliefs and activities."' By 1917, aliens could be
deported or excluded if they advocated or taught subversion, before
or after their entry into the United States." In addition, aliens who
were affiliated with organizations that advocated the overthrow of the
government or anarchy were deportable."" Challenges to these meas-
ures established the extent of resident aliens' First Amendment rights
because their speech and association rights were directly implicated."'
The subversive acts cases are also instructive because the subversive acts
context is somewhat analogous to the campaign finance context." 2 In
both contexts Congress's common purpose is to maintain the integrity
of the government by preventing, in the case of the former, subversion
and, in the case of the latter, corruption." 3
The Supreme Court has seldom confronted the issue of resident
aliens' First Amendment rights. The first major case was decided in
1945, when the Supreme Court held in Bridges v. Wixon that a resident
alien who had allegedly been affiliated with the Communist Party
(the "Communist Party" or the "Party") could not be deported." 4 In
1(}1 See, e.g., Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 962 F.2d 836. 841,
842, 843-44 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1040 (1994).
105 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
1()6 See, e.g., Katherine L. Pringle, Note, S'ilencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values
and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 81 Co.	 2073, 2085-90 (1993).
1()7 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (6th ed. 1990).
1 °8 ALFANIxoFT, supra note 3, at 478.
'° Id. at 479.
11 ° Id,
111 See generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135 (1945).
112 See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1085 (1085).
1 "1 See id. at 1085, 1088.
114 326 U.S. at 156.
July 19971	 FEDERAL ELECTION FINANCES
	 783
Bridges, the government instituted deportation proceedings against Harry
Bridges, although he had been in the United States for eighteen years,
because Ile had allegedly been affiliated with the Communist Party.' 15
The statute invoked provided for the deportation of any alien who at
any time had been a member of, or had been affiliated with, any
organization, such as the Communist Party, which advocated the over-
throw of the government by force."6 Mr. Bridges was a longshore-
man, and was active in several trade unions." 7 For four years, he was
responsible for the publication of a paper called the Waterfront Worker,
which had been launched by the Marine Workers' Industrial Union
("MWIU"). 118
 The MWIU had been founded by the Trade Unity League,
a communist organization."'"
The Court reasoned that in order to be affiliated with the Com-
munist Party, there must be evidence of a working alliance to bring the
party's goals to fruition.'" The resident alien must adhere to the
purposes of the party, not just cooperate with the party in its lawful
activities.' 21 Applying this definition, the Court concluded that Mr.
Bridges was not affiliated with the Communist Party because he only
cooperated with the Party to obtain lawful objectives. 122
 The Court
reasoned that although the Waterfront Worker was a militant trade-un-
ion journal, there was no evidence that it advocated the overthrow of
the government by force nor that Mr. Bridges sought to do anything
but promote unionism.'" The Court therefore held that Mr. Bridges
could not be deported.'"
Although the majority opinion focused on the statutory basis for
the Court's decision,'• Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion,
argued that resident aliens are fully protected by the First Amendment:
Pince an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion to all people within our borders. Such rights include
those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and
115 /d. at 137.
116 See id. at 138; see also 8 U.S.C. § 137(c) (1940).
" 7 See Bridgm, 326 U.S. at 140-41.
115 See id. at 145.
" 9 See id.
In See id. at 144.
121 See Id, at 143-44.
122
 See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 145.
Its See id, at 146.
124 &I' id. at 156.
See supra noles 120-24 and accompanying text.
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by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction be-
tween citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalien-
able privileges to all "persons" and guard against any en-
croachment on those rights by federal or state authority. .
Since resident aliens have constitutional rights, it follows that
Congress may not ignore them in the exercise of its "plenary"
power of deportation. 126
Thus, while Justice Murphy acknowledged that Congress retains a
plenary power over immigration, he made it clear that that power
was not to be exercised in violation of resident aliens' First Amend-
ment rights.' 27 Further, Justice Murphy asserted that the protection
afforded to resident aliens by the First Amendment was identical to
the protection enjoyed by citizens. 128
justice Murphy also suggested that, although the majority opinion
did not discuss it, the Court had concluded that Mr. Bridges' deporta-
tion could not be justified under the "clear and present danger" test,
the standard applicable to citizens.' 29 The "clear and present danger"
test, articulated by the Court in Schenck v. United States in 1919, re-
quired an inquiry into "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent.""° justice Murphy explained that the statute was
invalid under the test because the statute did not require proof of a
clear and present danger."' Thus, while the majority opinion's discus-
sion dealt largely with the statutory construction issue, Justice Mur-
phy's concurrence indicates that resident aliens' speech is fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and that any restrictions on their
speech are subject to the same degree of scrutiny applied to limitations
on citizens' political expression."2
126 Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring).
127 See id. (Murphy, J., concurring).
128 See id. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring).
129
	 id. at 159, 164-65 (Murphy, J., concurring).
1110 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In Schenck, the Court held that the conviction of a citizen under
the Espionage Act, which criminalized intentional interference with the United States' military
efforts, did not violate the First. Amendment. See id. at 48, 51-52. Charles Schenck, a member of
the Socialist Party, had mailed leaflets vilifying conscription to men listed in newspapers as having
passed their draft board examinations. See id. at 49, 50, 51. The Court reasoned that Schenck's
speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it presented a "clear and present
danger." See id. at 51-52. Specifically, Schenck's leaflets sought to influence the men receiving
them to obstruct the draft. See id. at 51.
See. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 164 (Murphy, J., concurring).
132 See id. at 156, 161, 164-65 (Murphy, J., concurring),
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After Bridges, the Supreme Court again addressed resident aliens'
First Amendment rights in 1952 in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.'" In
Harisiades, the Court held that three resident aliens could be deported
under 8 U.S.C. § 137 because of their memberships in the Communist
Party, even though the memberships terminated before the enactment
of the statute."4 Harisiades combined three cases.'" In each case, the
resident alien had come to the United States as a teenager.' 36 Two of
the aliens had married citizens, and all had children who were citizens
by birth.'" Each had been a member of the Communist Party at some
point in the past.'" Two of the three disclaimed belief in the use of
force to overthrow the government; the third disavowed knowledge of
the Party's principles.'" The aliens claimed that their due process
rights had been violated and that their membership in the Communist
Party constituted an exercise of their free speech and assembly rights
provided by the First Amendment."'
The Court first held that the deportation proceedings did not
deprive the aliens of clue process."' The Court reasoned that deporta-
tion decisions escape judicial review, and that deference to Congress's
plenary power over immigration is appropriate.'" The Court noted
that Congress has the power to terminate the hospitality extended to
any resident alien.'" Although the Court acknowledged that deporta-
tion was a severe measure, it asserted that it was a power inherent in
sovereignty and confirmed by international law.'" The country's policy
towards aliens, the Court reasoned, is "intricately interwoven" with its
foreign relations policies, war power, and maintenance of the repub-
lic.' 45
 The Court concluded that Is] uch matters are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference." 146 The Court thus held
that due process had not been violated because the resident aliens in
Harisiades were not entitled to judicial relief."'
13 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952).
I" Id. at 581, 591, 592, 590; see 8 U.S.C. § 137 (1940).
135 See 542 U.S. at 581-83.
136 See id. at 581, 582, 583.
137 See id.
See id. at 581-82, 583.
1 " See id at 582, 583.
1411 See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 583-84.
141 See id. at 591.
142 See id. at 588-89.
143
 See id. at 586-87,
144 See id. at 587-88.
145
 See. lIarisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-89.
146 Id. at 589.
147 See id. at 591.
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The Court next addressed the aliens' First Amendment challenge,
and found that it also did not bar their deportation. 14" The Court
reasoned that the First Amendment did not protect the practice or
incitement of violence." The Court distinguished between advocating
change through the ballot box, which was protected by the First Amend-
ment, and advocating change by force.'" Acknowledging that it can be
difficult to determine whether speech advocates political methods of
change or incites violence, the Court stated that the "clear and present
danger" test, enunciated in Dennis v. United States, was applicable to
First Amendment issues involving the Communist Party.''' Because
Dennis was decided less than a year before Harisiades, the Court de-
clined to discuss the application of this test any further, simply holding
that the First Amendment did not prevent deportation.'"
The "clear and present danger" test to which the Harisiades Court
referred evolved from the version introduced by the Schenck Court.'"
It had most recently been applied by the Court in 1951 in Dennis v.
United States.' 54 The Dennis Court held that the conviction of American
citizens for advocating the overthrow of the government did not violate
the First Amendment.'" The petitioners in Dennis were leaders of the
Communist Party. 156 They challenged the constitutionality of their con-
victions under the Smith Act, which made it illegal for any person to
advocate the overthrow of the government.'"
The Court upheld the petitioners convictions using the "clear and
present danger" test. 15" The Court explained that the "clear and pre-
sent danger" test required the Court to "ask whether the gravity of the
evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."'" Applying the test to the
petitioners, the Court concluded that their First Amendment rights
had not been violated because there was sufficient danger to warrant
the abridgement of free speech.'"" The Court noted that the petitioners
148 See id. at 591-92.
14° See id, at 592.
1611 See Ilarisiarles, 342 U,S. at 592.
151 See id.; Dennis v. Linked States, 341 U.S. 494,508,510 (1951).
152 See. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 580, 592; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494.
1113 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
154 341 U.S. at 508-11.
155 See id. at 516-17.
15" See id. at 497.
157 See id. at 495-96; see also 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1946).
158 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510-11.
159 See id. at 510.
110 See id. at 510-11.
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had developed "an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow
of the Government" and were prepared to initiate an overthrow "when
they thought the time was ripe."' 61 Even though an overthrow attempt
would likely fail and was not immediate, a finding of no clear and
present danger was not required.' 62 The Court reasoned that the gov-
ernment did not have to wait until overthrow plans had been made
and were about to be executed before the petitioners' First Amend-
ment rights could be abridged.'" As long as a "clear and present
danger" had been created, a citizen's First Amendment rights could
be curtailed, and therefore the Court held that the petitioners' convic-
tions in Dennis did not violate the First Amendmen 0 61
Like the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts appear to have
reached contradictory decisions concerning resident aliens' First Amend-
ment rights.'" In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Price v. United Slates INS, and
held that the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service's
("INS") denial of Mr. Price's petition for naturalization did not violate
the First Amendment.'" Mr. Price had been a resident alien for twenty-
four years when he applied for naturalization.°7 The application asked
him to list all his present and past memberships and affiliations.'"
Instead of answering the question, Mr. Price attached a legal brief
asserting that the question violated the First Amendment."
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, although resident aliens enjoyed
the protections of the First Amendment, the protection afforded to
them was limited. 171 Resident aliens are accorded an ascending scale
of rights, anti they achieve parity with citizens only upon their naturali-
zation. 171 In Congress's exercise of its plenary power over immigration,
the court further reasoned, Congress is permitted to make rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. 172 Deferring to Congress's
161 See id. at 510.
162 See id. at 5{}9.
163 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
164 See id. at 510-17,
165 See, e.g„ American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F,3d 1045, 1003-04, 1071
(9th Cir. 1995); Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Sem, 902 F.2d 8311, 842,
843-44 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040 (1994).
166 962 F.2d at 842, 843-44.
167 See id. at 837.
166 See id,
169 See id. at 837-38.
1711 See id. at 841.
171 See Price, 962 F.2d ar 842 n.6.
172 See id. at 841.
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power, the court found that only limited judicial scrutiny was appro-
priate and held that requiring Mr. Price to answer the question about
his affiliations did not violate his First Amendment rights.'"
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of resident aliens' speech
rights again in 1995 in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v.
Reno, and held that resident aliens could not be deported because of
their associations with certain disfavored political groups.' 74 The case
concerned eight aliens whom the government sought to deport be-
cause of their membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine ("PFLP").' 5 The PFLP allegedly advocated world commu-
nism, the destruction of property, and the assaulting or killing of
government officers.' 7"
The court reasoned that the political branches' foreign policy
powers permitted great discretion to exclude aliens, but that aliens who
reside in the United States are not subject to fundamentally different
First Amendment rights than are citizens.'" According to the court,
limitations on First Amendment rights damage the values underlying
First Amendment protections.' 78 If resident aliens did not have First
Amendment rights in the deportation context, their speech rights in
all contexts would be jeopardized because of the lingering fear of
deportation.' 79 Citing Bridges v. Wixon, the court specifically found that
resident aliens are accorded full freedom of speech.' 8°
Because resident aliens and citizens shared the same First Amend-
ment protection, the Ninth Circuit further reasoned, both were free
to associate with political organizations, even if those organizations
advocated illegal conduct or engaged in illegal acts.'"' Under the stand-
ard enunciated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, advocacy could be punished
only if it was "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action." 182 Applying the Bran-
173 See id. at 842, 843-44.
174 70 F.3d 1045, 1063-64, 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
175 See id. at 1052-53 & t1.2,
176 See id. at 1053. The aliens were charged under the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which
provided for the deportation of aliens "who advocate the economic, international, and govern-
mental doctrines of world communism," "the unlawful assaulting or killing of any [government]
officer," or "the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property . ." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (6) (13) and (F) (1982); see American-Arab, 70 F.3d at 1052 & n.2.
177 See American-Arab, 70 F.3d at 1056.
178 See id. at 1065.
173 See id. at 1065-66.
wy See id. at 1064.
181 See id. at 1063-64.
I 82 See American -Arab, 70 F.3d at 1063 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (per curiam)). The Brandenburg test used by the American-Arab court is a stricter, modern
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denburg test, the court determined that if the resident aliens had been
citizens, they could not have been arrested for their membership in
the PFLP because their advocacy did not rise to the level of inciting
imminent lawless action.'"" Because resident aliens enjoy the same First
Amendment rights as citizens, the court reasoned that their member-
ship was also protected under the same strict scrutiny analysis. 184 The
court thus held that resident aliens who reside in the United States are
entitled to the full panoply of First Amendment rights and therefore
cannot be deported for their associational activities.'"
In American-Arab, the Ninth Circuit distinguished its decision in
Price v. United States INS.' 86 The court explained that the essential
distinction was that Price involved a naturalization proceeding while
American -Arab involved a deportation proceeding.' 87 In Price, the court
held that a resident alien is not fully protected by the First Amendment
in the naturalization process.'" A question on the application regard-
ing his past and present memberships and affiliations therefore did
not violate his rights." The American-Arab court explained that Mr.
Price was not accorded full First Amendment rights because he sought
naturalization, not because he was a resident alien.''" The court rea-
soned that naturalization resembles exclusion proceedings, not depor-
tation proceedings, and before an alien is admitted to the United
States, he is unprotected by the Constitution. 191 The Price court spe-
cifically noted that "aliens at naturalization are not necessarily entitled
to the full protection of the First Amendment arguably afforded in
deportation hearings." 192 In a deportation proceeding, on the other
version of the "clear and present danger" test articulated by the Dennis Courl. See Brandenburg,
395 U.S. at 447; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510; Smoun, supra note 31, at 4-25, 4–'26. In Brandenburg,
the Supreme Court held that a citizen convicted ()1' criminal syndicalism—the advocacy of the use
of violence as a means of political reform—was deprived of his First Amendment rights. See 395
U.S. at 444-45, 449. The appellant in Brandenburg was the leader of a Klu Klux Klan group who
had been convicted tinder the Oltio Criminal Syndicalism statute. See id. at 444. The Court
reasoned that the stattue violated the First Amendment. because the advocacy of the use of force
could only he proscribed "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." See id. at 447, 448-49.
I" See American-Arab, 70 E3c1 at 1063.
184 See id. at 1063-64.
1145 See id. at 1063-64, 1071.
186 See id. at 1064-05.
187 See id.
188 See 962 F.2d at 842.
[89 See id. at 837, 842, 843-44.
19° See American -Arab, 70 F.3d at 1064-65.
191 See id.
19.4 Price, 9112 F.2d at 843 n.7.
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hand, an alien is no longer on the threshold of admission.' 93 He or she
has been allowed to join the national community and is entitled to the
protections conferred by that status.'" Thus, the American-Arab court
concluded that its decision was consistent with its decision in Price.' 95
In 1992, the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia in Rafeedie v. INS also held that resident aliens are fully protected
by the First Amendment, and therefore restrictions on their speech are
subject to the Brandenburg test. 1 • 6 Mr. Rafeedie had been a resident
alien for eleven years when he sought and received from the INS a
permit to travel to Cyprus because his mother was to undergo heart
surgery there.' 97 Instead of traveling to Cyprus, however, Mr. Rafeedie
allegedly went to Syria, where he attended a meeting of a group closely
associated with the PFLP.'"8 The INS moved, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (the "statute"), to prevent him from resuming residency
because of his association with the PFL13. 199
In holding the statute unconstitutional, the district court, citing
Justice Murphy's concurrence in Bridges v. Wixon, reasoned that resi-
dent aliens are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as
citizens, including the limitations imposed by the overbreadth doc-
trine.2Q° The overbreadth doctrine renders unconstitutional any statute
that prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech
or conduct. 21 ' The court then found the statute invoked by the INS to
be overbroad because it prohibited a substantial amount of expression
protected by the First Amendment. 2"2 According to Brandenburg, the
First Amendment. protects advocacy of the use of force or the violation
of laws unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion."2"3 According to the court, while Brandenburg would uphold the
statute if it prohibited only advocacy that incited imminent lawless
action, the statute instead prohibited all advocacy or teaching of the
"See American-Arab, 70 F. 3d at 1065.
194 See id at 1064-65.
195 See id. at 1064.
196 795 F. Supp. 13, 22-23 (D.l).C. 1992).
117 See id. au 16.
11tH See id.
19'9
	 id. at 15-17. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) provides for the exclusion of aliens who advocate,
inter alia, the assaulting or killing of any officer of the government, the destruction of property,
or the overthrow of the government by force. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F) (1988).
200 See Rafeedie, 795 F. Stipp. at 22, 23, 24.
20 L See id. at 22.
202 See id. at 22-23.
2"9 See id. at 22 (quoting Brandenlmrg, 395 U.S. at 447).
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proscribed doctrines. )"'' Thus, the court held that the overbroad stat-
ute was an unconstitutional abridgement of First Amendment speech
righ ts. 205
C. Cases Outside of the Subversive Acts Arena
There are a small number of cases which address the First Amend-
ment rights of resident aliens that fall outside of the subversive acts
arena. 24"'No case has been decided that addresses resident aliens' rights
in the campaign finance context, but these cases do hold that resident
aliens are fully protected by the First Amendment when they speak at
conferences in the United States, when they voice their opinions at
work and when they conscientiously object to military service. 2"7
These cases are important because the subversive acts context and
the campaign finance context are not entirely comparable. While the
legislative actions to prevent subversion and corruption share the goal
of maintaining the integrity of the governmen t, 2"8 the subversion cases,
which sought to deport resident aliens, evolved from a line of cases
dealing with the exclusion of aliens. 2°9 Congress's plenary power over
the exclusion of aliens in turn stems from its gatekeeping function. 21 "
The Supreme Court, in the Chinese Exclusion Case, stressed peace and
security concerns. 21 ' The highest duty of the government was to pre-
serve the nation against foreign aggression and encroachment. 212 Con-
gress's gatekeeping function, however, was not the source of Congress's
efforts to prevent campaign finance impropriety in the form of per-
ceived quid pro quos.2 n Congress passed the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974, which were challenged in Buckley v.
Valeo, because of the campaign funding abuses that prompted the
Watergate scandal. 214 Congress sought to safeguard the integrity of the
204 See id. at 22-23.
205 See Rafeedie, 795 F. Stipp. at 23, 24.
21" See, e.g., Underwager v. Channel 9, Austl., 69 E3d 361, 363-64, 365 (9th Cir. 1995); In re
Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439, 449 (811i Cir. 1970) (2-1 decision) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Brun-
nenkant v. Laird, 360 F. Stipp, 1330, 1332 (D.D.C. 1973).
2°7 See Underwager, 69 F.3d at 363-64, 365 (speaking at conference); Weitzman, 426 F.2d at
449 (opinion of Blackmun, j.) (conscientious objection to military service); Brunnenkant, E
Stipp. at 1332 (voicing opinions at work).
"See BeVier, supra note 112, at 1085, 1088 and accompanying text.
21 A9 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 581-83 (1889).
210 See. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
211
 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
212 see id.
213 See William," Connolly, Note, How Law Can You Cm? State Campaign Contribution Limas
and the First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. }W.,. 483, 487 n.25 (1996).
211 See
792	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 Md. 38:771
electoral process by eliminating the influence of large donations. 2 ' 5
The goal was the defense of the electoral system from takeover by
wealthy contributors, not the defense of the nation from foreign ag-
gression.216
hi 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Underwager
v. Channel 9 Australia held that the speech protections of the First
Amendment apply to all persons who are legally in this country. 2 "
University of Sydney Professor Kim Oates, who was not a citizen of the
United States, traveled to California for the San Diego Conference on
Responding to Child Maltreatment.m At the conference he replayed
part of a documentary aired by Sixty Minutes Australia. 219 The subject
of the documentary was an American psychologist named Dr. Ralph
Underwager, who had served as a witness at a number of trials on
the subject of the unreliability of children's testimony alleging sexual
abuse.22° The documentary disputed Dr. Underwager's theories and
creclentials. 22 ' Dr. Underwager sued Professor Oates in federal court in
California, alleging defamation .222
in affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for
Oates,'" the Ninth Circuit dismissed Dr. Underwager's assertion that
Professor Oates was not entitled to First Amendment protection be-
cause he was not a citizen. 224 The court framed the issue as whether
people who are not citizens or resident aliens, but nonetheless are
legally here, enjoy First Amendment rights. 225 This implies that the
court considered both citizens and resident aliens protected by the
First Amendment. 226 The court then held that legal visitors are also
accorded First Amendment rights, citing Justice Murphy's concurring
opinion in Bridges v. Wixon and reasoning that the text of the First
Amendment does not contain any express limitation regarding to
whom the right of free speech applies. 227
215 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
216 See id.; Chae Chan Ping, ISO U.S. at 606.
217 See 69 F.3d at 365.
218 See id. at 364, 365.
218 See id. at 364.
n " See id. at 363-64.
n i See id. at 364.
222 See Under-wager, 69 F.3d at 364.
228 See id. at 368.
224 See id. at 365.
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See Underwager, 69 F.3c1 at 365; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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In 1973, the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia came to a similar conclusion in Brunnenkant v. Laird, holding that
resident aliens have the same right to voice their opinions as American
citizens. 228 Mr. Brunnenkant was a resident alien and an engineer
employed by Boeing.m His security clearance, then at the level of
"secret," was withdrawn because his political, social and economic
beliefs were deemed contrary to the national interest, indicating that
he was unreliable and not trustworthy.24° The evidence against Mr.
Brunnenkant consisted of his criticisms of American foreign policy and
capitalism, which he shared with his co-workers, Navy Intelligence
officers and company security personne1. 231
The district court held that the revocation of Mr. Brunnenkant's
security clearance violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. 232
Noting its belief that Mr. Brunnenkant's West German alienage had
affected his employer's decision to revoke his clearance, the court
stated that resident aliens' expressions of their political, social and
economic views, however distasteful or unwise, are fully protected by
the First Amendment.233
In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in In Re Weitzman, voted to reverse the denial of a conscientious
objector's naturalization petition."' Mrs. Weitzman had applied for
naturalization after residing in the United States for three years. 2" In
the course of the government's questioning of her, she communicated
that she was unwilling to bear arms on behalf of the United States or
to perform noncombatant services because of her revulsion against
killing another person, not because of any religious belief. 236 The district
court denied Mrs. Weitzman's application for naturalization. 237
The main issue before the Eighth Circuit in this case was whether
it was constitutionally offensive to deny naturalization solely because
Mrs. Weitzman's conscientious objection was based on a personal moral
code rather than on a religious belief.'" The court voted two-to-one to
reverse the district court's denial of Mrs. Weitzman's naturalization
223 See 360 F. Supp. at 1332.
223 See id. at 1331, 1332.
23aSee id. at 1331.
231 See id.
232 See id. at 1331-32.
233
 See Brunnenkant, 360 F. Supp. at 1332.
234 See 426 F.2d 439, 440 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); id. (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
235 See id. at 441 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
233 See id. at 441 n.1, 442, 443 (opinion of Blackmun, Ji.).
2" See id. at 440 (per curiam).
233 See id. at 440-41 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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petition. 2" Judge Blackmun would have affirmed the denial and ar-
gued that it was constitutional to deny naturalization because Mrs.
Weitzman's objection was not based on a religious belief." ) Citing
Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, Judge Black-
mun noted as an initial matter that the protection under the free
exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amendment extends to
resident aliens. 241 Neither of the other two judges who heard the case
voiced any disagreement with the idea that resident aliens are pro-
tected by the First Amendment and voted to reverse for unrelated
reasons. 242
IV. THE BUCKLEY TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED TO
RESTRICTIONS ON RESIDENT ALIEN SPEECH
The strict scrutiny test used by the Supreme Court in Buckley v.
Valeo should also be applied to a ban on resident aliens' campaign
contributions and expenditures." 3 The first section below argues that,
in the subversion cases, restrictions on resident aliens' speech are
subject to the same protections as are limitations on citizens' speech. 244
Assuming that the subversion cases are comparable to political corrup-
tion cases, 245 the Buckley strict scrutiny test applied to limitations on
citizens' speech should therefore also be applied to limitations on
resident aliens' speech. 246 In addition, cases outside of the subversion
realm must also be consulted because subversion prevention is not
completely analogous to corruption prevention. 247 Although there are
few cases outside of the subversion context that address the First
Amendment rights of resident aliens, they do show that resident aliens'
First Amendment rights are equal to those of citizens, and thus restric-
tions on each should be subjected to the same test. 248 The second
section below asserts that Buckley should be read broadly as a case
239 See Weitzman, 426 F.2d at 440 (per curiam).
240 See id. at 440, 449 (opinion of Blackmun"). Judge Blackmun is the former Supreme Court
justice, participating in this case before his appointment to that Court.
241 See id. at 449 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
242 See id. at 454 (opinion of Lay, J.), 459-60 (opinion of Heaney, J.). Weitzman was a
two-m-one decision, and each judge in the majority wrote separately hecause they disagreed as
to the reasoning for the reversal. See id. at 140 (per curiam).
245 See 424 U.S. 1, 25-30, 44-49 (1976) (per curiam).
2" See infra Part IV.A.
215
 See. BeVier, supra note 112, at 1085, 1088.
2 '11 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-30, 44-49.
217 See supra Part 111.0.
218 See infra Part IV.A.
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which recognizes the role of resident aliens in our democracy. 249 Resi-
dent aliens contribute to the education of the electorate and in most
respects act as citizens in our society. 250
 In addition, the speech of other
non-voting entities, such as corporations and political action commit-
tees, has been protected under the Buckley test.25 '
A. Resident Aliens, Like Citizens, Are Fully Protected by the
First Amendment
The Chinese Exclusion Case established the Supreme Court's def-
erence to Congress's plenary power over immigration."' The Court
viewed immigration as within the realm of the political branches of
government because power over immigration decisions was necessary
to national sovereignty.'" Congress's immigration policies were there-
fore subject only to limited judicial review."'' Since the Chinese Exclusion
Case, however, the Supreme Court has limited Congressional power over
non-citizens. The subversive acts cases demonstrate that even in depor-
tation proceedings, resident aliens are afforded the same First Amend-
ment protections as are citizens.
The Supreme Court in Bridges v. Wixon, for example, implied that.
resident aliens are protected by the First Amendment in deportation
proceedings.25' In Bridges, the Supreme Court held that the govern-
ment could not deport. Harry Bridges for his alleged "affiliation" with
the Communist Party. 25" The Court narrowly interpreted the require-
ment in the statute invoked against Mr. Bridges that he be "affiliated"
with the Communist Party, concluding that he was not "affiliated"
because he did not have a working alliance with the Party.'" Mr.
Bridges was not "affiliated" because he simply cooperated with the
Party in its lawful activities$258
 Statutory, rather than constitutional,
215
 See infra Part IILB,
25° See, e.g., 50 U.S.G. App„§ 453 (1994) (requiring resident aliens to register for Selective
Service); Kenneth A. Gross, Consiiirdinn May Protect Contributions front Aliens, TH H li„ I)cc.
1, 1996. at 5 (noting resident aliens pay income and Social Security taxes).
;' 1 See, e.g, Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Con nit., 470
U.S. 480, 496 (1985) Ihereinafter NCPAC] (holding political action committee speech pro-
tected); First. Nat'] Bank ol' Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (holding corporate speech
protected).
252 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
2" See id. at 603-06.
2" See id. at 609.
255 See Bridges v. Wixom 326 U.S. 135, 137, 148, 119 (1945); Steven,]. Burr, Note, Immigration
and the First AMent1171e111, 73 C.:At,. L. Rev, 1889, 1908 (1985).
250 See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 156.
257 See id. at 143-44, 145.
258 See id. at 145.
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interpretation was therefore the stated basis of the Court's holding
barring deportation. 259
The Court implied, however, that the reason for its narrow statu-
tory construction was to avoid conflict with the First Amendment. 266
The Court stated in the course of its discussion that Ifireedom of
speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country... .
[T]he utterances made by [Bridges] were entitled to that protection." 26 '
Furthermore, Justice Murphy's concurrence noted that the statute
failed the "clear and present danger" test, which was the First Amend-
ment standard applicable to citizens at the time. 262 In order to deport
Mr. Bridges without violating his First Amendment rights, the "clear
and present" danger test required that the Communist Party advocate
and be immediately capable of using violence to overthrow the govern-
ment, and that Mr. Bridges join in such advocacy.m If the "clear and
present danger" test had been met, the danger to the public welfare
would have justified Mr. Bridges' deportation. 2" Regardless of the
outcome of the test, what is important is that citizens and resident
aliens are equally protected by the First Amendment because the same
test was applied to both groups.
At first glance, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy appears to defeat the
notion that resident aliens are fully protected by the First Amend-
ment. 26' A careful reading of Harisiades, however, confirms that the
Supreme Court intended for the speech of resident aliens and citizens
to be equally protected by the First Amendment. 266 In Harisiades, the
Court upheld the deportation of three resident aliens because of their
past memberships in the Communist Party. 267 The Court reasoned that
the government's decision to deport the aliens was largely immune
from judicial review because the political branches of government
exclusively possessed the power to formulate the country's policy to-
wards aliens.266 The Court further reasoned that the First Amendment
'259 See id. at 143-44, 145.
` 1() See Burr, supra note 255, at 1909.
261 Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148 (citations omitted).
262 See id. at 164 (Murphy,,]., concurring); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919);
Pringle, supra note 106, at 2073, 2087.
263 See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 164.
264 See id.
263 See 342 U.S. 580, 592, 596 (1952).
266 See id. at 592; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83
A.J.1.1_,. 862, 869 (1989).
267 See 342 U.S. at 581, 591, 592, 596.
2 '" See id. 588-89.
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did not bar the aliens' deportation because the First Amendment did
not protect the incitement of violence. 21 i''
The Court cited the "clear and present danger" standard as articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States as the standard
used to determine whether speech constituted incitement to violence. 270
Declining to discuss its analysis under Dennis, however, the Court
simply stated that "the test . . . has been stated too recently to make
further discussion at this time profitable." 271
 The Court's failure to
explain its application of Dennis is problematic because it raises the
possibility that the Court did not apply the test at all, opting instead
to defer to Congress's determination. 272
 Indeed, it would have been
difficult for the Court to find that the three aliens presented a "clear
and present danger" under Dennis. 273
 The resident aliens in the case
claimed either not to believe in the use of force to overthrow the
government or to lack any knowledge of the aims of the Communist
Party.274
A better interpretation of the Court's terse reference to Dennis is
that the outcome of the Dennis "clear and present danger" test was
influenced by Cold War era fears of foreigners and Communism. 275 The
Rosenbergs, accused of passing atomic secrets to the Russians, were
tried and convicted in 1951, the same year Dennis was decided. 276
 The
Army-McCarthy hearings commenced only three years later. 277
 The
Court's decision in Dennis not to protect communist citizens under the
"clear and present danger" test foreshadowed the Court's decision not
to protect resident aliens in Harisiades.278
 The evidence against the
citizens in Dennis appears to be just as tenuous as the evidence used
to deport the resident aliens in Harisiades.279
 In Dennis, the Supreme
Court's review was limited to a determination of the constitutionality
of the Smith Act, under which the citizens were prosectited. 2" The
289 See id. at 592.
2711 See id. at 592 & n.18; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
271 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592.
272
 See Burr, supra note 255, at 1910; Pringle, .supra note 106, at 2088.
273 See Pringle, supra note 106, at 2088.
274 See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 582, 583.
275 See Aleinikoff, supra note 266, at 868-69.
776
 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494; see generally SECRET Auurrs; TILE ROSENBERG CASE, MCCAR-
THYISM AND FIFTIES AMERICA (Marjorie Garber & Rebecca L. Walkowitz, eds. 1995).
277 See generally SECRET AGENTS, supra note 276.
278 See George C. Beck, Note, Deportation on Security Grounds and the First Amendment: Closing
the Gap Between Resident Aliens and Citizens, 6 GEO. Imm. 14 803, 807 (1992).
279 See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581-83; Dennis 341 U.S. at 498.
289 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 495-96.
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Court did not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury's findings that the petitioners conspired to organize the Commu-
nist Party and that they advocated the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment.28 ' The Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit had found that the record supported the jury's
findings, but the Dennis Court enumerated only the "broad conclu-
sions" of the Second Circuit, not specific findings of fact. 282 These
"broad conclusions" do indicate that the petitioners were the leaders
of an organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, but they hardly support the Supreme Court's finding that the
petitioners were prepared to initiate an overthrow whenever the op-
portunity presented itself. 283
The view that the Harisiades decision is a product of its time
appears to be an interpretation shared by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. In American-Arab v. Anti-Discrimination Committee v.
Reno, the court stated that "read properly, Harisiades establishes that
deportation grounds are to be judged by the same standard applied to
other burdens on First Amendment rights." 284 That the Harisiades Court
cited Dennis as the applicable standard, even if the outcome was not
favorable to the resident aliens, supports the conclusion that resident
aliens, like citizens, are fully protected by the First Amendment. 285
This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the lower federal
courts have recognized speech rights of resident aliens in the subver-
sive acts cases they have decided. 286 In Rafeedie v. INS, the District Court
for the District of Columbia held that restrictions on resident aliens'
speech are subject to the test enunciated in Brandenburg v. Ohio—a
current, stricter version of the Dennis "clear and present danger" test,
and the test applicable to restrictions on citizens' First Amendment
rights.287 More recently, in American-Arab, the Ninth Circuit similarly
held that efforts to restrict resident aliens' associations with disfavored
groups are subject to the Brandenburg test.288 The American-Arab deci-
sion also clarifies the Ninth Circuit's earlier holding in Price v. United
States INS, which upheld the requirement that a resident alien seeking
281 See id. at 497.
282 See id. at 497, 498.
283
	 id. at 498, 510.
284 See 70 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Aleinikoti, supra note 266, at 869).
285
 See Halisieules, 342 U.S. at 592 Sc n.18.
2"" See supra Part III.B.
27 705 F. Supp. 13, 22 (D.D.C. 1992); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969);
SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 4-25.
-4`88 See 70 F.3d at 1063.
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naturalization disclose all his present and past memberships and affili-
ations."89
 Although Mr. Price was a resident alien who was denied the
protection of the First Amendment, he was not denied protection
because of his resident alien status."" Mr. Price was denied First Amend-
ment protection because the naturalization process is an exclusion
proceeding, not a deportation proceeding.m The American Arab court
explained that in an exclusion proceeding, a non-citizen is unpro-
tected because he is "at the threshold of admission: 2'2 In a deportation
proceeding, however, a non-citizen is protected because he is a mem-
ber of the "national community;" his "presence within the territorial
jurisdiction" entitles him to constitutional protection. 2" The wisdom
of denying First Amendment protection to non-citizens whom the
government seeks to exclude from the United States, through the
denial of initial admission or naturalization, can be debated. The
Rafeedie, Price and American
-Arab decisions taken together, however,
clearly indicate that resident aliens are fully protected by the First
Amendment. 294
Cases outside of the subversive acts context also support the pro-
position that resident aliens are entitled to the same speech rights as
citizens. 295 The Underwager v. Channel 9, Australia, Brunnenkant v.
Laird and In re Weitzman cases demonstrate that resident aliens' First
Amendment rights extend beyond the deportation context.'" The
Constitution protects the speech rights of resident aliens not only when
they are faced with deportation, which is tantamount to a criminal
punishment, 297
 but it also protects resident aliens when they speak at
conferences, criticize government policies and practice their relig-
2149
 See id. at 1064-65; Price v. United States INS, 962 F.2d 836, 837, 842, 843-44 (9th Cir.
1995), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1040 (1994).
299
 See Price, 962 F.2d at 837, 842, 843-44.
291 See American-Arab, 70 F.3d at 1064-65.
292 See id. at 1065.
294 See id. at 1064-65.
294 See id.; Price, 962 F.2d at 841-42; Rafeedie, 795 F. Stipp. at 22-23.
295 See Underwager v. Channel 9, Austl., 69 F.3(1 361, 363-64, 365 (9th Cir. 1995); In re
Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 1970) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Brunnenkant v. Laird,
360 F. Stipp. 1330, 1331, 1332 (D.D.C. 1973).
296
 See Underwager, 69 F.3d at 363-64, 365; Weitzman, 426 F.2d at 449 (opinion of Blackmun,
J.); Brunnenkant, 360 F. Supp. at 1331, 1332.
297 Justice Douglas, in Bridges a Wixon, acknowledged the severe consequences of deporta-
tion for the first time: "[A]lthough deportation technically is not criminal punishment, it may
nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to pursue a vocation or calling
• [I)]eportation may result in the loss of all that makes life worth living." Bridges, 326 U.S. at
147 (internal citations and quotations omitted): see Pringle, supra note 106, at 2086.
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ions.298
 If resident aliens' speech is protected in all of these contexts,
it is logical that their political speech is also protected.
All of the cases that explore the extent of resident aliens' First
Amendment protection thus support the contention that citizens and
resident aliens have the same speech rights. 299 In the subversive acts
context, efforts to deport resident aliens because of their speech have
been subject to the same version of the "clear and present danger" test
as restrictions on the rights of citizens."° Outside of deportation pro-
ceedings, resident aliens are also protected to the same extent as
citizens."' A ban on campaign contribution and expenditures by resi-
dent aliens should therefore also be judged by the same standard by
which similar limitations on citizens' rights are evaluated—the stand-
ard enunciated in Buckley. 302
B. The Buckley Test Applies to Resident Alien Speech
Before discussing the application of the Buckley test in Part V, it is
useful to note that the First Amendment policies in the Buckley deci-
sion apply equally to both citizens and resident aliens."' The Buckley
Court, in finding that contributions and expenditures constitute First
Amendment political expression, did not limit its holding to citizen
donors."`' Since the Buckley decision, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that the speech, in the form of contributions and expendi-
tures by corporations and groups which themselves cannot vote, is
protected by the First Amendment."5 For example, the Buckley test
protects corporations, political action committees and chambers of
commerce."6 If groups such as these are entitled to full First Amend-
ment protection, surely resident alien individuals are also protected.
See Underwager, 69 F.3d at 363-64, 365 (speaking at conference); Weitzman, 426 F.2d at
449 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (conscientious objection to military service); Brunnenkant, 360 F.
Supp. at 1331, 1332 (voicing opinions at work).
299 See supra Parts III.A and
"See supra notes 262-94 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
" See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-30, 44-49.
"See id. at 14-15.
3°4
 See id.
3()5 See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 994 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) ("The mere
fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech from the ambit of the First
Amendment."); Federal Election Cornm'n v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985) (concluding that
the expenditures of political action committees are entitled to First Amendment protection); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 ( [978) ("The inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.").
:106 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 657; NCPAC 470 U.S. at 496; Bellotli, 435 U.S. at 777.
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To be sure, the right of individuals who are citizens to contribute to
candidates for whom they are ineligible to vote has not been ques-
tioned. Citizens frequently and substantially contribute to candidates
for office in states in which they do not reside. 307
The language used by the Buckley Court can be interpreted broadly
to include resident aliens' speech."°8 The Court was concerned with
having an informed electorate, achievable through "uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. 3°° Contributions and
expenditures by resident aliens contribute to this public debate be-
cause they help to raise issues of concern to immigrants. Even though
resident aliens cannot vote, they educate and inform citizen voters
regarding issues of importance to them, particularly foreign policy
issues. 31 ° Finally, the Buckley Court also emphasized the role of public
debate in the functioning of a democracy: "Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitu-
tion."3 " In other contexts, resident aliens contribute to the functioning
of the government. Resident aliens, for example, can be drafted into
the armed forces. 5 t 2 Resident aliens also pay income and Social Security
taxes. 3 ' 3
 Thus, given the role of resident aliens in the functioning of
the government and the education of the electorate, the Buckley Court's
policies indicate that their contributions and expenditures should benefit
from full First Amendment protection. 11 ''
V. APPLYING THE BUCKLEY STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
Under Buckley, the Supreme Court must first determine whether
a ban on contributions and expenditures burdens resident aliens'
3" 7
 See Federal Election Commission's 1995-1996 Candidate Receipts Report - Individual Contri-
butions, Aug. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, LEG1S library, MEMFIN file (indicating contributors
who do not reside in New York donated 24% of money puked during 1995-96 election cycle by
Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.) for his 19911 campaign); see also Ken Mornsugn and Michael
Slackman, State GOP Says $4.4M Raised in 1° Half of '96, NEwsonv (N.Y.), July 17, 1996, at A19
(noting Travelers Insurance of Hartford, Conn. contributed $100,000 of $4.4 million raised by
New York State Republican Committee).
3t*See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
" See id. at 14 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
310 See Miguel Perez, Rut Nation is Happy to Let Immigrants Serve in Army, THE REcotto
(Northern NJ.), Oct. 27, 1906, at 004 (noting iuuuigrants have always sought to affect foreign
policy, and our intervention in two World Wars was influenced by our Anglo-Saxon roots).
311 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
312 See 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (1994).
313 See Gross, supra note 250.
514 See 424 U.S. at 14-15.
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political expression. 315
 If it does, the ban must be subjected to a strict
scrutiny test, which first asks whether the burden is justified by a
compelling state interest.'" If it is, the final inquiry is whether the ban
is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest without need-
lessly inhibiting resident aliens' free speech rights. 317 Both a ban on
contributions and a ban on expenditures violate the First Amendment
under the Buckley test. 3 t 8
A. Both Bans Burden Resident Alien. Speech
A ban on contributions to particular candidates and a ban on
independent expenditures both burden resident aliens' right of politi-
cal expression:"• Because the Buckley Court found that a $1,000 con-
tribution cap at least marginally burdened the contributor's ability to
engage in speech, the Court would certainly find that a complete ban
on contributions is also a burden. 32" Applying the Court's reasoning
that a contributor's expression consists solely of the symbolic act of
contributing, it follows that if a resident alien is prevented from per-
forming even that symbolic act, his or her First Amendment rights have
been burdened. 321
 An expenditure ban also burdens free speech. The
Buckley Court held a $1,000 expenditure ceiling to be a severe restric-
tion on the freedom of political expression because it prevented citi-
zens from using the most cost effective means of communications, such
as newspaper advertisements, to express their political views: 322 A com-
plete ban on expenditures would also implicate the Court's general
concern that limitations on spending result in less campaign speech
because of the cost of the mass communication that is important to
modern election campaigns.323 A ban on expenditures would certainly
mean that fewer issues would be discussed by fewer people in less depth
due to the high cost of mass communication. i 2 ' The Supreme Court
should thus hold that bans on resident aliens' contributions and ex-
316 Sea 424 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1976) (per curiatti).
316 See id. at 25-26. 44-49.
317 See id. at 25, 27-28, 29-30.
319 See id. at 25-30, 44-49.
319
 See id. at 19-21.
32 ' See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
321
 See id. at 21.
3222
	 id. at 19-20 & 11.20.
323 See id. at 19.
32.1 See id.
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penditures burden political expression. The bans must therefore be
subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis. 325
B. No Compelling Interest Justifies the Burden Placed on. Speech
As for the first part of the strict scrutiny test, whether a burden
on speech is justified by a compelling government interest, the govern-
ment interest the Court has historically weighed against the burden
placed on free speech by contribution and expenditure ceilings is the
prevention of corruption, or the appearance of corruption." 2° In Buck-
ley, the Court explained that the integrity of our democracy is under-
mined by even the perception that large donations are given in exchange
for political favors. 327 In the case of a resident alien contribution and
expenditure ban, the government specifically seeks to avoid even the
perception that the United States' foreign policy is for sale. 28 Resident
alien donors should not be able to secure changes in our foreign policy
in exchange for the contributions, nor should anyone be able to
question whether changes in foreign policy were the result of access
bought by wealthy non-citizens.
1. Contributions
It is unlikely that the Court would conclude that the government's
interest in avoiding the perception or actuality of corruption is com-
pelling enough to uphold a complete ban on contributions by resident
aliens. Although the Buckley Court held that the government's interest
in preventing the appearance of improper influence justified a limit
on contributions, a key step in its reasoning was that the $1,000 cap
still permitted "the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution . . . ."329 The Court viewed the $1,000 limit as only a
marginal speech restriction, and thus it was easier for the government
to justify."" A complete ban, however, is much more restrictive because
it denies any symbolic show of support whatsoever.
525 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-30. 44-49.
326 See id. at 26; see also Colonurio Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2313 (1990),
527 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
328 See, e.g., William Safire, Link Between U.S. Foreign Policy, Indonesian GO Evident, FRESNO
BEE, Oct. 21, 1996, at F15.
5•9 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21, 20.
"I See Id. at 20-21.
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It may be argued that if resident aliens are permitted to continue
to contribute to candidates, they will bundle their contributions to gain
influence, thus creating the appearance of impropriety. While this
concern is valid, it must be noted that it is equally valid in the case of
citizen contributions. The Buckley Court did not address the concern
that contributions may be bundled to gain influence, but the Supreme
Court has implied that this concern does not rise to the level of a
compelling government interest because it has protected the speech
of political action committees, which are organizations of contributors
whose aim is to influence public policy."'
The government's interest in preventing improper influence on
our foreign policy by resident aliens must also be balanced with the
strong need for resident aliens to make their voices heard through
contributions and expenditures. Because resident aliens cannot vote,
the most effective means available to them to express their opinions
on government actions is through contributions and expenditures."2
The interests of resident aliens are affected by government policies,
and donations are the best way for resident aliens to inform candidates
and the electorate of their viewpoint."' Resident aliens pay taxes and
serve in the military, so they should be able to express an interest in
policies pertaining to at least those subject matters. Resident aliens
should also be able to make contributions and expenditures to voice
their concerns regarding congressional measures directed specifically
at them. A recent example is welfare reform. The legislation adopted
excludes legal immigrants from receiving most welfare benefits, includ-
ing food stamps and Supplemental Security Income for the elderly and
disabled."' Other areas affecting resident aliens include antiterrorism
measures, immigration statutes and English-only laws."' Because resi-
dent aliens cannot vote, they need to be able to express their political
views on these measures through their contributions and expenditures.
331 See Federal Election Comm'n v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 490, 497-98 (1985) (holding
limitations on political action committees' expenditures unconstitutional because no indication
such expenditures have tendency to corrupt or give appearance of corruption).
332 See Bruce D. Brown, What the Constitution and Good Policy Require; Politics, Monty and
Foreigners, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at 25.
333 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14; supra Part II.A (discussing the Buckley Court's recognition that
an important function of campaign contributions and expenditures is to inform).
3" See George C. Church, Ripping Up Welfare with Not a Little Drama, Tim, Aug. 12, 1996,
at 18, 20; Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Welfare Bill Amid Division, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1996,
at Al.
335 See David Simcox, Chasing Public Opinion on Immigration, COURIER-JOURNAL. (Louisville,
Ky.), May 15, 1996, at 15A; Catherine Yang, Commentary: Let's Stop Beating Up on Legal Immi-
grants, Bus. WK., Dec. 16, 1996, at 82, 82.
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It would be a much more difficult question if the proposal were
for a $100 contribution limit instead of a complete ban. By allowing a
resident alien to contribute something to a campaign, he is able to
symbolically express his support, and thus satisfy the Buckley Court."Hf
One concern a $100 contribution limit might raise, however, is that it
is too low."7
 The ceiling could be raised while still addressing the
government's interest in preventing actual or perceived corruption.
The Court in Buckley declined to decide what an appropriate contri-
bution limitation would be.38
 As long as it found that some contribu-
tion limit was justified, the Court stated that it was not equipped to
probe whether a $2,000 limit would serve just as well as a $1,000
ceiling."9
Whether contributions from resident aliens are limited to $100 or
completely banned, there is a further reason why both are impermis-
sible limitations on First Amendment speech. In Buckley, the govern-
ment sought to justify the expenditure limitation by arguing that it had
an ancillary interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections. 34° The Court rejected
this justification, stating that "the concept that the government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment
. . . "341
 Thus, if the government sought to ban or limit to $100 resident
aliens' contributions while maintaining the $1,000 limit on citizens'
contributions, the Court should find that the First Amendment does
not permit the government to magnify the voice of citizens at the
expense of resident aliens' political expression. The First Amendment
should also prohibit the government from allowing resident aliens to
contribute only towards those issues of special concern to them, such
336 See 424 U.S. at 21.
337 If Congress were to limit resident alien contributions to $100 while continuing to allow
citizens to contribute $1,000, equal protection concerns would also be implicated. A discussion
of these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of resident aliens' Fifth
Amendment due process rights, see generally Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)
(holding that Civil Service Commission regulation barring noncitizens, including resident aliens,
from employment in federal civil service positions was unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
without due process in violation of Fifth Amendment) and Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
(holding that Congress may condition alien's eligibility for participation in federal medical
insurance program on continuous residence in United States for five-year period and admission
for permanent residence without violating Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
335 See 424 U.S. at 30.
33'J See id.
"J See id. at 48.
841 ./d. at 48-49.
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as immigration policy, because this measure similarly seeks to limit the
voices of resident aliens in favor of the voices of citizens.
2. Expenditures
According to the Buckley Court, a ban on resident aliens' expen-
ditures would be an even more severe restriction on speech than a ban
on contributions, and therefore even more difficult for the govern-
ment to justify.342 The Buckley Court found the government's interest
in limiting citizens' expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candi-
date" to $1,000 to be insufficient for two reasons. 343 First, the expendi-
ture limitation only banned some large expenditures and thus would
not eliminate actual or perceived impropriety.' 44 In order to avoid
unconstitutional vagueness, the Court interpreted the phrase "relative
to a clearly identified candidate" to include only those expenditures
that, in express terms, advocated the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate!'• According to the Court, the limitation did not
alleviate the danger of corruption because of the ease with which those
seeking to buy influence could circumvent the expenditure limita-
tion."46 The promotion of a candidate and his views did not violate the
statute; only those expenditures that expressly advocated a candidate's
election or defeat were limited by the expenditure ceiling considered
in Buck/ey.347 Thus, a contributor could circumvent the limitation by
refraining from expressly advocating a candidate's election or defeat
in a newspaper advertisement, for example. 348 Under the challenged
act, the contributor remained free to purchase advertisements promot-
ing a candidate without advocating his or her election.'"
It must be noted that a complete ban on all expenditures by
resident aliens would close the loophole the Buckley Court identified
and would therefore serve the government's interest in preventing
corruption."5" A complete ban would, however, create two problems.
First, a complete ban burdens First Amendment speech more than the
ceiling considered by the Buckley Court on only those expenditures
"relative to a clearly identified candidate." Second, the Court in Buck-
3•12 See id. at 19-21.
3-15 See 424 U.S. at 44-47.
344 See id. at 45.
345 See id. at 42, 44.
346 See id. at 45.
347 See id.
348 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
549 See id.
35° See id. at 45.
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ley, without explaining why, stated that no societal interest would be
served by a loophole-closing provision. 35 '
The best explanation for the Buckley Court's comment that no
societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing provision is
found in the Court's second reason for finding that the government
had not shown a sufficiently compelling interest. 352 The Court reasoned
that, because independent expenditures by definition are not control-
led by or coordinated with a candidate, it is unlikely that expenditures
are given for quid pro quos, and therefore expenditures do not pose
the danger of real or apparent corruption." 3 According to the Court,
independent expenditures are not as valuable to the candidate as
contributions made directly to his campaign, and may even prove
counterproductive because the candidate lacks any control over the
medium or the message."'
Given this reasoning, it is unlikely that the Court would uphold a
complete ban on resident aliens' expenditures. Although a complete
ban on expenditures would close the loophole left open by the statute
at issue in Buckley, the Buckley Court implied that any sort of limitation
on expenditures violates the First Amendment because expenditures
do not create the reality or appearance of impropriety. 55 The ban
would therefore fail to justify the severe burden placed on speech.
The government might attempt to bolster its argument by assert-
ing that the need to prevent impropriety is especially great in the
foreign policy realm. Foreign policy, like Congress's plenary power
over immigration, involves issues of national sovereignty and interna-
tional law. If United States foreign policy is viewed as being for sale to
the highest contributor, our independence and credibility as a nation
331 See id.
33.2 See id. at 45-47.
353
 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46, 47. Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's rea-
soning on this point. AS one noted:
It seems quite fanciful to believe that these expenditures will go unnoticed by
candidates, and hence will not exert any corrupting influence, or that. these expen-
ditures are totally uncoordinated since often candidates and committees share
political consultants. In logical contrast to the Buckley Court's conclusion, expen-
ditures of significant sums can not only unduly influence the outcome of elections
but can also influence the views of candidates themselves. Otherwise the expendi-
tures would not be made.
Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments . qf 1974: Look Who's
Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REv. 357, 369 (1995). Regardless of the validity of this criticism,
however, Buckley has not been overruled by the Supreme Court, and thus the Court's reasoning
stands.
334 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
955 See id. at 45-47.
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are questioned in the international community. 356 The situation is
made worse, so the argument goes, because resident aliens are foreign-
ers. Placing the direction of United States foreign policy in the hands
of foreign powers, through resident aliens, would be the ultimate blow
to national sovereignty. 357
Foreign policy, however, is no different than any other policy. The
integrity of our foreign policy formulation is important, but the integ-
rity of our agricultural policy or economic policy is just as important.
The nation's independence and credibility in the international arena
is equally called into question when it appears that any domestic policy
has been formulated for the benefit of a particular group of contribu-
tors. If the government is to curb the influence of resident aliens
seeking changes in foreign policy, it must also curb the influence of
wealthy citizens seeking changes in domestic policies. In addition, any
influence resident aliens are able to exert on foreign policy is hardly
tantamount to foreign powers directing United States foreign policy. 358
Although residents aliens are not citizens, because they have been
permitted to reside in the United States indefinitely in many respects
they function like citizens and are entitled to the protections and
privileges this status confers. 359
3. Narrowly Tailored
The Supreme Court thus should refuse to hold that the govern-
ment's interest in preventing actual or perceived impropriety justifies
a complete ban on resident aliens' contributions and expenditures. If
the Court were to so hold, the question of whether the ban is narrowly
tailored would not be reached. If, however, the Court were to hold that
the government's interest is sufficiently compelling, the Court would
likely also find that the ban is narrowly tailored and therefore passes
the second part of the Buckley strict scrutiny testa° This would mean
that the contribution and expenditure bans would not violate the First
Amendment and would be upheld. The Court would probably reason
that the limitations are not over-inclusive. 36 ' Although most people who
expend or contribute large sums of money probably do not seek to
356 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602-09 (1889).
357 See id.
356 See id.
356 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (1994) (requiring resident aliens to register for Selective
Service); Gross, supra note 250 (noting resident aliens pay taxes).
366 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 27-28, 29-30.
361 See id. at 29-30.
July 19971
	
FEDERAL ELECTION FINANCES 	 809
improperly influence a candidate, the Court would reason that the
limitations are narrowly tailored because it is too difficult to isolate
suspect contributions and expenditures. 362 The Court would further
reason that the government's compelling interest in safeguarding against
the appearance of impropriety requires the complete removal of any
opportunity for abuse.'"
CONCLUSION
A ban on campaign contributions and expenditures by resident
aliens is unconstitutional because resident aliens are fully protected by
the First Amendment. 364 Although case law in the subversive acts con-
text would seem to indicate judicial deference to Congress's plenary
immigration power,365 unequal treatment of resident aliens' speech
rights was the product of the Cold War era. 366 During the Cold War,
the protection accorded to citizens' speech was also curtailed. 31 i7 Cases
outside of the subversive acts context confirm that resident aliens are
entitled to the same First Amendment protection as citizens. 366 Because
resident aliens and citizens enjoy the same speech rights, the strict
scrutiny test applied in Buckley must be applied to a ban.'" The deter-
mination that the Buckley test must be used is in effect the determina-
don of the result. Because the Buckley Court considered much less
restrictive limitations on speech," the Court would, and should, hold
complete bans on contributions and expenditures unconstitutional.
This result is consistent with good public policy."' Resident aliens are
expected to participate in society like citizens in most respects; 372 they
should be afforded the same opportunities.
JESSICA S. HORROCKS
562 See id.
363 See id. at 30.
364 See supra Part IV.
" See supra Parts IIIA and 111.B.
366 See supra Part IV.A.
367 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951).
" See supra Parts BEG and IVA.
369 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-30, 44•49 (1976) (per curiani).
370
 See id, at 7.
371 See supra Part V.B.
372 See id.
